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TOPIC VI. 
Should the Declaration of Paris, 1856, be revised. 
CONCLUSION. 
The Declaration of Paris, 1856, should be revised. a 
DISCUSSION AND NOTES. 
Recogn~'tion of rig Ids of tltose engaged in 1naritilne com-
rnerce.-Neutrality, as no'v understood, 'vas practically un-
kno\vn in the lVliddle Age~. Grotius, in 1625, had only a 
vague idea of this status. Trade had, howeyer, l,.ery early 
brought about a recognition of the rights of those engaged 
in conunerce. Distinctions were tnade according to the 
nature of the goods and the nationality of the vessel car-
rying the goods. 
l'he States of northern Europe gradually inclined toward 
the principle of ''free ships free goods,~' which 'vas enun-
ciated in the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Aix-la-Chapelle, 
1748, and supported in the armed neutrality of 1780 and 
of 1800. Other nations opposed~ and practice and profes-
sion yaried 'vith the tin1es. l\1any discussions on the status 
.. of prh,.ate property at sea took place in the early day~ of 
the United States. 
The principle of '~free ships, free goodg," except con-
traband of 'var, has been 'videly inserted in United States 
treatie~-Algiers, 1815, 1816; Bolivia, 1858; Brazil~ 1828; 
Colombia(NewGranada), 1846; Dominican Republic, 1867; 
Ecuador, 1839; France, 1778; Guatemala, 1849; Haiti, 
1864; Italy, 1871; l\!Iexico, 1831, and 1nany others. At 
the present time the principle is inserted in treaties in 
a For the binding force of this Declaration see notes on Protocol 
No. 24, p. 110. 
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foree "~ it h Bolivia. 1858 ~ I~raz iL 18:28: Colon1 bin, 18±() ~ 
1-Iaiti, 18H±: Italy.1871: Pern.185H: Pru~sia, 1785~ Rn~sia, 
18;)±; SwPden and Xorway, 1783. 
rrhe po~ition of G-reat Britain and Fnulee in 185-± was 
such a~ to gi,·e great \\~eight to any declaration which 
I night be n1ade by these ~tate~. l'hei r attitude toward 
the treatrnent of neutral property at ~ea and toward pri-
,·at£leri ng he fore thi::; tinH• had not been the sa niP. 1 t was 
nr·cc~sary, however. that in regard to affairs in sonthea~t­
ern _Europe they aet together. Dbcu::;~ions in r£lgard to 
policy of 1nariti1ne warfare took place, and they gTadnally 
approaehed an agreen1ent upon the treatu1ent of neutral 
property. privateeri ng. and blockade, "~hich prepared the 
way for the declaration of Pnrb in 185(). 
,.fhe Briti~h declaration. \Yith reference to nPutral~ and 
letter::; of 1narque. Jlarch :28~ 18;)±. and the 11"rench declara-
tion "·ere practically the ~arne: 
Her ::\Iajesty the Queen of the enitecl Kingdom of Great Britain an<l 
Ireland, haying been <:ompelled to take up arm~ in support of an all~·, 
is de8irous of rendering the war a~ little oneron~ as pos~ihle to the 
powers with whom t:he remain:-: at peace. 
I 
To presern~ the- commen·e of nPntrals from all unneces~ary obstnw-
tion Her 1\Iaje:::;ty is willing, for tlte pn,~ent, to waiYe a part of thP 
belligerent rights appertaining to her by the law of nations. 
It i~ impo:-:sible for Her )[aje:-:ty to forego the exercise of her right 
of ~eizing arti('l£>:-: cnntrahancl of war aiHl of pnwenting Iwntral:::; from 
bearing the enemy's <lispatche~, and she nm~t maintain the right of a 
belligerent to pren~nt neutrals from breaking any effectiYe bloc·kade 
which may be establi~hed with an adequate force against the enemy's 
fort::;, harbor:-:, or <.·oa:~:t:::;. 
But Her )lajesty will waive the right of seizing enemy'~ property 
laden on board a neutral ,·essel nnle~s it be contraband of war. · 
It is not Her ~Iaje:-:ty's intention to claim the ('Onflsc-ation of neutral 
property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships, 
and Her )fajesty further dedares that being anxious to lessen as 
much as po~sible the e\·ils of \Yar. and to restrict its operations to the 
regularly organized force~ of the ('OUntry it is not her pre~ent inten-
tion to issue letter~ of marque for the commi~sioning of privateer:-:. 
\Vestminster, ~larch 28, 18.5-!. ( -16 State Papers, p. 36.) 
TAe Declaration of I)ari8~ 185{}.-,.fhe rights which 
France and Great Britain had thus vvaiYed by the concur-
rent declarations of :\larch 28-29, 185±, naturally becanle 
the subject of negotiation at the close of the \Val'. At the 
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conference of Pari~ in 1856 these 1nattcrs \vere brought 
for\vard and ad ,·anced 1neasures "·ere urged by the ~""'rench 
representath·es. 'fhere resulted the enunciation of the 
set of rules known as the declaration of Paris of 1856. 
1"'he Declaration of Pari~ as gh·en by llertslet, "Map of 
Europe by Treaty~, (ii~ p. 1~82), is as follo\vs: 
The Plenipoteutaries who signed the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of 
l\Iarch, 1856 (So. 264), a~::3embled in Conference,-Cousidering: 
That :Maritime Law, in time of \Y ar, has long been the subject of 
deplorable disputes; 
That the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in sueh a matter, 
gives rise to difference:-: of opinion between S eutrals and Belligerents 
which may occasion ~erious difiicultief', and even conflict~; 
That it is consequently advantageous to establish a uniform doctrine 
on so important a point; 
That the Plenipotentarie~ a~scmbled in Congress at Paris cannot 
better respond to the intention~ by which their Uovcrnments are ani-
Inated, than by seeking to introduce into international relations fixed 
principles in thh; rel-:lpect; 
The above-mentioned Plenipotentaries, being duly authorized, re-
solved to concert among themselves as to the Ineans of attaining this 
olJject; a11d, haYing come to an agreement, have adopted the follow-
ing solemn Declaration: 
PRI\.ATEEIUNG. 
1. Privateering is, and remainf:-1 abolished. 
~ECTIL\L FLAG. 
2. The Neutral Flag covers Ene1ny's Goods, with the exception of 
Contraband of \Yar. 
XErTHAL noons. 
3. Neutral Goods with the exception of Contral>and of \Var, are not 
liable to eaptun· under Enemy's Flag. 
BLOCKADES. 
4. Blockades, in order to l>e lJinding, must he effectiYe, that is to 
Hay, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the 
eoa~t of the enemy. 
The Go,·ermnents of the Undersigned Pleuipotentaries engage to 
bring the pre~ent Declaration to the knowledge of the States which 
have not taken part in the Congress of Paris, and to invite then1 to 
accede to it. 
Convinced that the maxims which they now proclai1n cannot but 
be received w~th gratitude oy the whole world, the undersigned 
Plenipotentaries doubt not that the efforts of their Goyernments to 
obtain the general adoption then·of, will he erownt..>d with full success. 
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The prese:1t Declaration i:::; not and shall not be binding, except 
between those Powers who have acceded, or shall accede, to it. 
Done at Paris, the 16th of April, 1856. 
To thi~ declaration all important States adhered except 
:l\'lexico, Spain, and the U nitcd State~. Spain and ~lexieo 
agreed, except to the abolition of priYateering. The 
United States desired the exetnption of all priyate propert~T 
frotn ~eizure. 
]J!'otocol .1\To. 924.-In addition to the Declaration of 
Paris of April 16, 1856, there 'Yas a protocol nutnbercd 
24 containing the following: 
On the proposition of Count 'Valews:ki, and recognizing that it is for 
the general interest to n1aintain the indivisibility of the four principleR 
mentioned in the deelaration ~igned this day, the plenipotentiaries 
agree that the powers \Yhich 8hall have ~igned it, or whieh ~hall have 
acceded to H, can not hereafter enter into any arra.ngernent in regard 
to the application of the right of neutrals in time of war, which does 
not at the same time rest on the four principles which are the object 
of the said declaration. 
By the above agreement the po,v-ers are bound. A~ 
Count ''r alewski said in a letter to Count de t)artiges in 
~lay, 1856: 
The plenipotentiaries assembled in the congress of Paris have come 
to an agreement on the tenns of a declaration intended to settle the 
principles of maritime law in so rnuch as it concerns neutrals <luring 
war. . Herewith I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of that 
act, which fully meets the tendencies of our epoch, and at once puts 
an end to the useless calarnities \Yhich a custom equally reprobated by 
reason and by humanity, superadded to those which fatally result 
from a state of war. 
The cor1gre::;s have not overlooked the fact that their work, in order 
that it may prove complete, n1ust ~ecure the a:::;sent of all the maritime 
powers, since such governrnents only as shall have acceded to the 
arrangement can be mutually bound by it. On this score we attaeh 
peculiar value to the concurrence of the United States, that will not 
consent, we confidently trust, to hold 'off from a concert of action which 
defines a new and essential progress in international relations. 
The detennination of the congress of Paris defines the object which 
it is intended to att~in. The clashing constructions given to the rights 
of neutrals have, up to the last year, proved a source of deplorable 
conflicts, whilst privateering inflieted on the comn1erce and navigation 
of nonbelligerent states an injury so 1nueh the more grievious as it 
gave roorn for the rnost calamitous excesses. 
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These, Count, are the events which, for our part, we are happy in 
striving to repel, and we feel convinced that the concurrence of the 
United States will not be \Vithheld in a question every way worthy of 
the philanthropic spirit of the American people; a question which at 
once, and in a high degree, concerns the development and the security 
of cmnmercial transactions. 
The plenipotentiaries sent to the congress have, as you rnay see in 
portocol No. 24, bound then1selves, in the nan1e of their respective 
governments, to enter, for the future, into no arrangement on the 
application of 1naritime law in titne of war without stipulating for a 
strict observance of the four points resoh·ed by the declaration. The 
concurrence which we solicit at the hands of those governments which 
were not represented in the Paris conferences can, consequently, apply 
to those principles 'Only laid down in said declaration, and which are 
indivisible. (Senate Ex. Doc., 34th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 104, p. 2.) 
Attittttde of the United States.-l'he attitude of the 
United States was thus expressed in President Pierce's 
message of December 4, 1854: 
The proposition to enter into engagetnents to forego a resort to pri-
vateers, in case this country should be forced into a war with a great 
naval power, is not entitled to rnore favorable consideration than would 
be a proposition to agree not to accept the services of volunteers for 
operations on land. 'Vhen the honor or rights of our country require 
it_ to assume a hostile attitude it confidently relies upon the patriotism 
of its citizens: not ordinarily devoted to the rnilitary profession, to 
augment the Arn1y and Navy, so as to 1nake them fully adequate to the 
emergency which calls them into action.. The proposal to surrender 
the right to employ privateers is professedly founded upon the principle 
that private property of unoffending noncmnbatants, though enemies, 
should be exempt from the ravages of war; but the proposed surrender 
goes but little way in carrying out that principle, which equally 
requires that such private property should not be seized or molested 
by national ships of war. Should the leading powers of Europe con-
cur in proposing, as a rule of international law, to exempt private 
property upon t.he ocea_n frmn seizure by· publie armed cruisers as 
well as by prh·ateers, the United States \Yill readily meet then1 upon 
that broad ground. 
The United States Government 'vished to extend the 
provision of th~ Declaration of Paris, saying: 
The injuries likely to result from surrendering the don1inion of the 
seas to one or a few nations which have powerful navies arise mainly 
from the practice of subjecting private property on the ocean to seizure 
by belligerents. Justice and humanity dernand that this practice 
should be abandoned, and that the rule in relation to such property on 
land should be extended to it when found upon the high sea~. 
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The President therefore proposes to ~Hld to the first proposition in 
the "dt•claration" of the eongre~s at Paris the following- word~: "And 
that the priYah_• property of the l"nbjed or dtizen~ of a belligerent on 
the high l"eas t'hall be exetupted from f.:t•iznre ~-,y public armed Yef:~eiR 
of the other lwlligen•nt, except it l>e contraband." Thus amended, 
the Goyernment of the United StateR will adopt it, together with the 
other three prindples contained in that "dPclaration." 
I mn directed to eommuni(·ate the approntl of the President to the 
f:eeond, third, and fourth propositionf=, in<lependently of the fin:t, 
should the amen(hnent Le nnaeeeptal>le. The mnendmcnt is emn-
mended l>y 80 nwny powerful eonsiderationf", and the principle which 
calls for it has so long had the emphatic f.:anetion of all enlightened 
nations in military operations on land, that the President is reluctant 
to believe it willtneet "·ith any serious opposition. \\~ithout the pro-
posed 1nodification of the firf:t principle, he c~n not conyince hiinself 
that it would be wise or safe to change the existing law in regard to 
the right of prh·ateering. (Senate Ex. Doc., 34th Cong.,-Istsess., No. 
104, p. 13.) 
It 'vas well understood, as ~hown by the discussions, that 
the principles set forth in the Declaration of Paris were ad-
vanced opinions. Protocol No. 22· of the session of April 
8, 1856, relates that-
l\I. le Cmnte 'Yalewski propose au Congre:-~ de terminer son muyre 
par un dedaration qui constituerait nn progres twtable dans le droit 
international, et qui serait accueillie par le monde entier avec t1n sen-
tiinent de Yive reconnaissance. 
Le Congres de \Yestphalie, ajonte-t-il, a consacre la liberte de con-
science, le Congres de Yienne }'abolition de la Traite des noirs et la 
liberte de la nasigation des fleuYes. 
Il serait Yraiment digne du Congres de Paris de poser les bases d'un 
droit Inaritime en temps de guerre, en ce qui concerne les neutres. 
Les 4 principes suivants atteindraient completement ce but: 
1. Abolition de la course; 
2. Le paYillon neutre cOU\Te la Inarchandise ennemie, excepte la 
contrebande de guerre; 
3. La marchandise neutre, excepte la contrebandede gnerre, n'et:t 
pas saisissab}e meme SOUS paYillon enne1ni; 
4. Les blocu::-:! ne sont obligatoires qu'autant qu'ils sont effectifs. 
Ce serait certes h't un beau n?sultat auquel aucun de nons ne saurait 
etre indifferent. 
'fhe Declaration of Pari~ certainly does not 1neet 'vith 
that general approval 'vhich its protnoters had anticipated, 
and a~ titne pa~~es it becomes n1ore and n1ore in need of 
revision. As Duboc says: 
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La Declaration de Paris n'etablit done, <t tout prendre, qu' un regime 
precaire, non sans danger pour les belligerants, non sans peril pour les 
neutres. Aussi beau~oup parmi ses partisans et parmi sa~ adversaires 
pensent-ils qu'elle n'est las definitive. Tandis que eeux-ci demandent 
qu'on la denonce, ceux-hl pretendent qu'on la complete. Les pre-
miers estiinent qu'on aresserre les droits des belligerants dans des lim-
ites trops restreintes, les autres, qu' on leur accorde encore des libertes 
exeessives. Ces derniers pretendent parfaire le droit Inaritime etas-
surer definitivement la securite des neutres en supprimant toute con-
fiscation de la propriete enne1nie. (Le Droit de laGuerre l\laritin1e, 
p. 71.) 
There are many differences of opinion in regard to the 
phraseology of the Declaration of Paris. Some prefer a 
n1ore explicit definition, others would retain the general 
tern1s. (Perels, Seerecht, seetion 49, I.) Thonier in a 
recent work says: 
lHalgre le progres ilnmense qu'elle a realise, en faisant passer de la 
doctrine dans la pratique la liberte du conunerce neutre, la declaration 
fe Paris presente cependant quelques lacunes. Elle n'a pas ose aller 
jusqu'au bout dans la voie des refonnes liberales et declarer, ainsi que 
le proposaient les Etats-Unis, l'inviolabilite de la propriflte privee sur 
la Iner. 
Elle est nl(~me inferieure ~l la Declaration russe de 1780, en ce qui re-
garde le blocns, par l'absence de prescriptions concernant le rapproch-
ement des forces bloquantes, ee qui pern1et les blocus por eroisiere. 
Enfin, elle garde le silence au sujet de la contrebande de guerre, 
dont il y aurait en si grand interet ~1. donner une definition precise· et 
enumeration. (De la Notion de Contrebancl de Guerre, p. 39.) 
1. "Privateering i8 and re1nains abolished. "-It might 
with good reason perhaps be contended that in the first 
place the tern1 ''declaration" i~ not properly applicable 
to the action taken by the plenipotentiaries on April 16, 
1856, and kno,vn as the ~'Declaration of Paris.'~ 
The provisions of the so-called "declaration" are, ho,v-
ever, of great ilnportance. 
The plenipotentiaries, according to the tenns of the Dec-
laration, conHider "that 1narititne la'v in tin1e of 'var has 
long been the subject of deplorable disputes." ,.fo avoid 
~on1e of the disputed points they hope to establish '"a 
unifortn doctrine" and ''having conH~ to an agreement" 
have adopted the '' solemn declaration." 
A serious ohjection 'vas at the tin1e raised against this Dec-
laration~ to the effect that of the plenipotcntiarie~ 'vho 
16843-06-8 
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~igned it, son1e had no authorization to aet in the n1atter, but 
as their action ",.as never di~clai1ned it n1ust be held to be 
binding. It is held in Great Britain that so far as the 
Declaration itself i~ concerned it has neYer been properly 
authorized. 
The oOYious intent of the first clause of the Declaration 
of l>ari:::;, ~~ PriYateering is and re1nains abolished," was 
that frorn the date of its adoption ·war ~hould be confined 
to the regularly counnis~ionrd Yes~els built for hostile pur-
poses. Debate~ and discus~ions of the rule sho'v that it 
\ras thus understood by nutny officials in its early days. 
Doubtless the opposition to the rule w·onld haye been 111nch 
less ntarked in the U nitrd States if it had been understood 
to n1ean tnerely that fro1n its adoption the u~e of pri,,.ate 
yessels for belligerent purpo~es shall he allowed only "·hen 
they are under responsible control of one of the belligerents. 
T. G. Bowles, writing in 1878 after there had been much 
discussion on the suhjecL show·s that the effect of the first 
clause of the Declaration of Paris abolishing priyateering 
is open to differences of interpretation. Of the general 
proYisions of the Declaration he says: 
The effect of them upon Great Britain is without doubt and beyond 
question greater than upon any other power, because Great Britain, 
being the principal1narititne power in the world, n1ust feel more than, 
any other the effects of any change in the laws of rnaritime warfare. 
And the fact that l-i-reat Britain has shown her:::elf before the change 
"·as made able to resi::-:t the whole of Europe in arms, and to come 
victorious out of the struggle by the. very aid of the very principles 
now declared to be abrogated and reYersed, rnust lead us to conclude 
in limine that the change n1ade is one fraught with especial disad-
vantage to her. Let us, however, examine the changes themselves 
and their effects. 
I. "Privateering is and remains abolished," that is to eay, is abol-
ished for Great Britain whenever she is at war with any other States 
than the L"nited States or Spain; but not when she is at war with 
either of tho~e two. The effect of this is to d(:'prive Great Britain of 
the serYices of \'olunteers at ~ea, and to preclude her from employing 
in warlike operations either the Yes~els or the 1nen of her vast Iner-
cantile rnarine; for a privateer is but a pri ,·ate \'eE!~el commissioned by 
the State. She loses thus not only an offensiYe but also a defensive 
weapon; for privateers do not only capture (:'nemy's vessels, but ah;o 
recapture those of their own natwn; and the>· are to the State navy a 
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most valuable auxiliary, without which an amount of power propor-
tioned to the size of the men~antile marine of the State remains unem-
ployed in time of war. She loses the power of withdrawing a 
consideraule number of merchant yessels from exposure to the ene1ny 
as unarmed merchantmen by-turning the1n into offensive weapons as 
armed cruisers, and thus at once diminishing the number of vessels 
liable to be captured and increa~ing the number of those able to cap-
ture. She loses one of the best schools for the formation of daring and 
adventurous sailors, and with it those traditions of prize m·oney 'Yon 
in conflict, which haYe always been found the Inost urgent incentive 
to daring and ad yentnrous men. (:Maritime \Varfare, p. 83.) 
It may be safely said that prior to the tin1e of the Dec-
laration the first clause, viz, '' Privateering is and ren1ains 
abolished," would ha,~e been regarded as a proposition 
very liable to stir up unnecessary ''deplorable disputes." 
Privateering had been an accepted 1neans of l\7 arfare which 
'vas supposed to give to a ~tate an opportunit}T. to enlarge 
its navy. In regard to privateering, Secretary ::\la:t:cy, in 
a letter of July 28, 1856, to Count Sartiges, said that for· 
those powers acceding to the Declaration of Paris it would 
be necessary to "surrender a principle of tnaritime law 
whieh has never been contested-· the right to employ pri-
vateers in tilne of w·ar. '' The first clause of the Declaration 
can not be properly regarded as one whose introduction 
removed disputes. 
It has been the object of n1uch criticism. In the first 
place, the Declaration is a conYention binding signatory 
powers only. ~I any of the leading n1en in the 'states 
which becatne parties to the Declaration 'vere opposed to 
this provision. Sotne Inaintained that it was not suffi-
ciently definite, but would give rise to action in effect like 
pri 'Tateering under another name, or so tnasked as to avoid 
eonde1nnation under the letter of the la,v. Such critics 
also rnaintained that what was needed was an agreen1ent a~ 
to the use of private or quasi-private vessels in ti1ne of 
'var, with such regulations as l\7 ould a'Toid the evils of pri-
vateering. The truth of this position as to the need of 
definite regulations for the use of such vessels in tin1e of 
war has become n1ore ancl tnore evident since 1856, and the 
status of voluntary or auxiliary fleets is at present a nutt-
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ter of uncertainty, in\·olving gra \'"e con~equences. Just 
w·hat was really abolished and rrtnained aboli~hed under 
the first clause of the Drclnration has brcotne an increas-
ingly i1nportant question. 
'rhe United States \Yere ,,·illing to aeeedr to the l)eclara-
tion "·hen it "·as thought that it "·ould work to the ad,·an-
tagc of the Xorth against the South, at the oprning of the 
ei,·il "·ar. 
'"fbe French .. A.cadetny had di~cussed the question of aboli- · 
tion of priYateering- in 1860, and the practice of priyateer-
ing ''as ably defended. It \nl~ not denird that priYateering 
should be regulated. for this \\·a~ generally adtnitted. It 
''as not quite clear what. the "·ord "' prh'"ateering'' in-
cluded. 1"'he discussion a~ to the definition of the "·ord 
was rene,\ed through the action of the Prussian Go,·ern-
Inent in 1870. 
It is necessary that the proYision in regard to prh·ateer-
ing be tnerg-ed in the question of the regulation of the 
status of pri,·ate or quasi-prh·ate ships ·whieh in tilne of 
·war are introduced into the 1nilitary forces of the bellig-
erent. 
~Ir. F. R. Stark, in his careful ~tudy on the "" .. A holition 
of pri,·ateering~ ., says: 
The Declaration of Paris is truly, as ::\Ir. ::\Iarcy said, a halfway 
1neasnre. It is inehoate, unfinished, and, it can not be denied, ~ome­
what faulty, as the first steps of all great reform::: haYe been. But to 
eall it an epoch-making eyent or a red-letter day in the calendar of 
the law of nations would be superfluou~. Perhap:-: that which i~ to 
<."ome-the abolition of all capture of private property at sea, indtHl-
ing the abolition of cmnmercial blockades-is ea~ier than that w hkh 
has already been aceomplished. In international law, as in other 
things, it is the first step that <."ostti (p. 15H). 
Attitude of Unt"ted States on aoo!t:tion (~f pl·ivatee-rlnr;.-
On the clause in regard to prh·ateering~ ~Ir. ~Iarcy, in hi~ 
letter to Count Sartiges, n1akes variou:-; con1n1ent~. a1nong 
which is the follo·wing: 
If the principle of capturing pri\·ate property on the oeean and con-
deinning it as prize of war be giyen up, that property would, and of 
right ought to be, as secure from mole:-:tation by publie armed vessels 
as by prh·ateers; but if that principle be adhered to, it would be 
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worse than useless to attempt to confine the exercise of the right of 
capture to any particular description of the public force of the bellig-
erents. There is no sonwl principle by which such a distinction can 
be sustained, no capacity which could trace a definite line of separa-
tion proposed to be 1nade, and no proper tribunal to which a disputed 
question on that subject could be referred for adjushnent. The pre-
tense that the distinction may be supported upon the ground that 
ships not belonging pern1anently to a regular navy are more likely to 
disregard the rights of neutrals than those which do belong to such a 
navy is not well sustained by Inodern experience. If it be urged 
that a participation in the prizes is calculated to stin1ulate cupidity, 
that, as a peculiar objection, is rernoved by the fact that the same pas-
SIOn is addressed by the distribution of prize 1noney among the officers 
and crews of ships of a regular navy. Every nation which authorizes 
privateers is as responsible for their conduct as it is for that of its 
navy, and will, as a 1natter of prudence, take proper precaution and 
~ecurity against abuses. 
But if such a distinction were to be atte1npted, it would be \·ery 
difficult, if not impracticable, to define the particular class of the pub-
lic 1naritime force which should be regarded as priyate~rs. "Deplora-
ble disputes," 1nore in number and more difficult of adjustment, would 
arise fro1n an atten1pt to discriminate between privateers and public 
anned ships. 
If such a discrin1ination were atte1npted, every nation would have 
an undoubted right to declare what vessels should constitute its navy 
and what should be requisite to give then1 the character of public 
anned ships. These are Inatters which could not be safely or pru-
dently left to the determination or supervision of any foreign power, 
yet the decision of such controversies would naturally fall into the 
hands of predominant naval powers, whirh would have the ability to 
enforce their judg1nents. It can not be offensive to urge weaker 
powers to avoid as far as possible such an arbitrament and to main-
tain with firmness every existing barrier against encroachments from 
such a quarter. 
No nation which has a due sense of self-respect will allow any other, 
belligerent or neutral, to detennine the character of the force ·which 
it may dee1n proper to use in prosecuting hostilities; nor will it act 
wisely if it voluntarily surrenders the right to resort to any 1neans 
sanctioned by international law which, under any circumstances, 1nay 
be advantageously used for defense or aggression. (Senate Ex. Doc. 
No. 104, 34th Con g., 1st. sess., p. 9.) 
2. Free ships, free yoods.-The second clause of the 
Declaration of Paris is: 
The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of con-
traband of war. 
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This phraseology has gi,·en rise to certain tnisconcep-
tions particularly because son1e hayc inferred that contra-
band of w·ar n1ight be thus affinncd of enerny goods. The 
probable intent of the clause was to the efl'ect that-
The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of such 
as would, if neutral, be contraband of war. 
If, howeyer, all innocent pri\·ate property at sea is to 
be exen1pt frotn capture, 'vhether neutral or ene1ny, the 
phraseology is correct in the nutin~ becau::;e in such eYent 
the doctrine of contraband n1ust be extended to enemy as 
"·ell as to neutral property. 
'The phraseology also introduces the question of destina-
tion, w·hich is essential in contraband. Neutral goods 
bound for a neutral port, e\·en though consisting of arn1s 
and annnunition, are not contraband. \Vould cnen1y 
g·ood::; of sirnilar natur~ bound for a neutral port be ex-
cinpt fro1n capture under a strict interpretation of the 
::;eeond clause of the declaration? 
It 1nay be justly held that if the belligerent is to b~ 
bound by the second clause of the Deelaration, viz, ; 'The 
neutral flag co,·ers enerny·s g·oods~ \Yith the exception of 
contraband . of war,'' the neutral ~hall be held to n1ake 
plain to the belligerent that the flag is truly neutral. 
.. A ~ornewhatfnll presentation of the effect of this Declara-
tion upon establishing a cleti'nition of contraband of w·ar 
and of the significanee of Protocol Ko. 24 is given by Chief 
,f ustice Berkley in the case of the Osaka Slto.sen 11ai8ltct 
versus the o"·ners of the ~tc~unship p,'OJnetlteus in 1904: 
In my opinion the expression ''contraband of war" has a well-
known and accepted meaning among the civilized commercial powers 
of the world. If that \Yere ·not so we should not, as \Ye do, find that 
expression used without definition in solemn treaties between the 
powers. The expression "<.:ontraband of war" is used without any 
definition of its meaning in the Treaty of Paris of the 16th April, 1856. 
The inference .frmn that fact i:-:, to my Blind, irre:-:i~tible that there 
was no definition needed, becau:;:e the expression had the same defi-
nite rneaning in the minds of all the plenfpotentiaries of the powers 
parties to that treaty. 
The Treaty of Pari~, to which Russia is a party and to which she 
still adheres, cmnmences \Yith the following preamble: "Considering 
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that maritiine law in time of war ha~ long been the subject of deplora-
ble disputes, that uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a 
matter gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and 
belligerents which 1nay occasion serious difficulties, and even conflicts, 
that it is consequently advantageous to establish a uniform doctrine 
on so important a point; that the plenipotentiaries assemble in Con-
gress at Paris can not better respond to the intention by which their 
Governments are animated than by seeking to introduce into inter-
national relations fixed principles in this resped." Then immediately 
follows this declaration: "The above-1nentioned plenipotentiaries, 
being duly authorized, resoh·ed to concert among the1nselves as to 
the means of attaining this object, and haxing cmne to an agreement 
have adopted the following solemn declai~a'ti'o11: 
(1) Privateering is and retnains abolished 
(2) The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of 
contraband of war. 
(3) Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not 
liable to capture under the enemy's flag. 
( 4) Blockades in order to b~ binding 1nust be effective-that is to 
say, maintained by a force ~ufficient really to prevent access to the 
eoast of the enemy. 
I draw special attention to the fact that the expression "contra-
band of war" is twice used in this declaration without being in any 
way defined. This declaration was designed to give effect to the 
opinion of the plenipotentiaries expressed in the preamble, viz, that 
it was to the advantage of the civilized world to establish a uniform 
doctrine on the subject of maritime law in time of war, and with that 
object in view to introduce certain ''fixed principles." At the same 
sitting of the plenipotentiaries the following re~olution was adopted 
(Protocol No. 24): "On the proposition of Conn t \V alewski, and 
recognizing that it is for the general interest to 1naintain the indivisi-
bility of the four principles 1nentioned ·in the declaration signed this 
day, the plenipotentiaries agree that the powers which shall have 
signed it, or which shall have acceded to it, can not hereafter enter 
into any arrangen1ei1t in regard to the application of the right of 
neutrals in titne of war which does not, at the same tiine, rest on the 
four principles which are the object of the said declaration." 
It will be observed that by this Protocol the plenipotentiaries of Rus-
sia bind that Power not hereafter to adopt any attitude toward neutrals 
in time of war which does not rest upon the four principles enunciated 
in the declaration. This Protocol has an important bearing upon the • 
contention at the Bar that Russia as an independent sovereign State 
possesses, as a concomitant to the right to 1nake war, the right to 
declare what shall or shall not be cousidered contraband of war. 
I dwell here upon the fact that the expression "contraband of war" 
occurs twice in the declaration in the treaty of Paris; that the expres-
sions '' pri vateering '' and ''blockade'' occur each once ; and that there 
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is in that declaration no definition of the meaning of any of those 
expressions. 'Vhy was there thi:-: omission to define these expressions? 
\Vas it not because they each had in the 1ninds of the plenipoten-
tiaries of the Powers a recognized meaning at the time when the treaty 
was signed? And because the expression "contraband of war" no 
1nore needed definition than the expressions "blockade" or "priva-
teering" did. 'Vhat, then, was the meaning which it must fairly be 
assmned the plenipotentiaries attached to the expression ''contraband 
of war," as used hy the1n in the Treaty of Paris? It see1ns to me that 
the plenipotentiarie~ had in their 1ninds the meaning which at that 
time attached to the expression "contraband of war" resulting from 
the decisions of the courts of law of the nations of Europe and Amer-
ica; principally, indeed, the decisions in the English courts on cases 
arising during the Sapoleonic war. \Yhat, then, is the result of those 
decisions'? 'Vhat Ineaning has been thereby attached to the expres-
sion "contraband of war?" The result has been to attach to that 
expression the following twofold meaning: (1) Absolute contraband 
of war, which includes eYerything useful for war only; (2) that 
which is conditional contraband of war, which ineludes all which, 
though useful for both pe~ce and war, becomes contraband if destined 
for the purposes of war, excluding frmn the 111eaning of contraband of 
war such things as are useful for the purposes of peace only. "Pro-
visions," consequently, come within the definition of conditional con-
traband only if and when destined for the enmny's forces; otherwh=e 
they are excluded from the definition. That is, in my opinion, the 
true 1neaning to be attached to the expression "contraband of war," 
and that is the sen8e which, in n1y opinion, that expression bears on 
a true construction of the declaration of the plenipotentiaries who 
signed the Treaty of Paris of 1856. 
The Supre1ne Court decision in the case of the Peterlu~jf 
(5 "\Vallace Supre1ne Court Reports, 28) giYes an opinion 
on contraband: 
The classification of goods as contraband or not contraband has 
1nuch perplexed text writers and jurists. A strictly accurate and sat-
isfactory classification is perhaps impracticable, but that which is best 
supported by American and English decisions 1nay be said to divide 
all merchandise into three classes. Of these classes, the first consists 
of articles 1nanufactured and prhnarily and ordinarily used for Inili-
tary purposes in time of war; the second, of articles which 1nay be 
- and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances, 
and the third, of articles exclusi,·ely used for peaceful purposes. 
Lawrence's 'Yheat., 772, 776, note; the Commercen, 1 'Vheat., 382; 
Dana, \Vheat., 629, note; Pars. ~Iar. Law, 93, 94. :Merchandise of 
the first class, destined to a belligerent country or places occupied by 
the army or navy of a belligerent, is always contraband; merchandise 
of the second class is contraband only when actually destined to the 
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military or naval U8e of a belligerent; while merchandise of the third 
elass is not contraband at all, though liable to f-:eizure and condmnna-
tion for violation of the blockade or siege. 
2. Free goods alu.Ytys .free.-,.fhe third clause of the Dec-
laration of Paris is: 
Neutral goods with the exception of contraband of \Yar are not 
liable to capture under enmny's flag. 
Such matters as the dE:lstruction of belligerent Yessels · 
haYing on board neutral cargo tnay giYe rise to eonlplica-
tions under the third clause of the Declaration. "\Yhile 
by this clause the goods are not liable to capture they 
tnay under necessity of war be subject to severe treatn1ent. 
Hall says of this 1natter : 
In 1872 the Frenrh prize court gave judgment in a case, arising out 
of the war of 1870-71, in which the neutral owners of property on board 
two German ships, the Ludwig and the Vonciirts, which had lJeen 
destroyed instead of being brought into port, claimed restitution in 
value. It was decided that though "under the tenns of the Declara-
tion of Paris neutral goods on hoard of an enen1y's vessel can not be 
seized, it only follows that the neutral who has embarked his goods 
on such vessel has a right to restitution of his n1erchandise, or in case 
of sale to pay1nent of the sun1 for which it 1nay have been sold; and 
that the Declaration does not import that an inden1nity can be 
dmnanded for injury which 1nay have been caused to hin1 either by a 
legally good capture of the ship or · by acts of war which n1ay haye 
accompanied or followed the capture;'' in the particular case ''the 
destruction of the ships with their eargoes having taken place under 
orders of the com1nander of the capturing ship, because, frmn the 
large number of prisoners on board, no part of the crew could be 
spared for the nayigation of the prize, such destruction wa~ an act of 
war, the propriety of which the owners of the cargo could not call in 
question, and which barred all claim on their part to an indmnnity." 
It is to be regretted that no limits were set in this decision to the 
right of destroying neutral property mnbarked in an enemy's ship. 
That such property should be exposed to the consequences of neces-
sary acts of war is only in accordance \Yith principle, but to push the 
rights of a belligerent further is not easily justifiable, and might under 
smne circumstances mnount to an indirect repudiation of the Declara-
tion of Paris. In the case, for example, of a state, the ships of \vhich 
were largely engaged in carrying trade, a general order given by its 
enemy to destroy instead of bringing in for condmnnation would 
amount to a prohibition addressed to neutrals to employ as carrier 
vessels, the right to use which was expressly conceded to them by the 
Declaration in question. It was undoubtedly intended by that Decla-
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ration that neutrals should be able to place their goods on board bel-
ligerent Ye~sel:-:: without as a rule incurring further risk, than that of lo~~ 
of n1arket and time, and it ought to be incumbent upon a captor who 
destroys such goods together with his enemy's yessel to proYe to the 
satisfaction of the prize court, and not merely to allege, that he ha~ 
acted under the pressure of a real Inilitary necessity. (International 
law 5th e(l. p. 717.) 
'fhe reported acts of son1e of the Yessels of l{ussia dur-
ing the l{uf-'so-,Japanese w·ar also sho\Y that there is need of 
further pro\"isions in the Declaration'. 
±. Blocl·ade8. a-~lr. ~Iar<.!y's opinion in regard to the 
fourth clause of the Declaration, the clause in regard to 
effecti,Te blockade, is one which has receh·ed .frequent 
sanction. He said: 
The fourth principle contained in the ''declaration," namely: 
"Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effectiYe; that is to say, 
maintained by a force sufficient really to preYent access to the coast of 
the enemy;" can hardly be regarded as one falling within that cla:::s 
with which it was the object of the congress to inte1·fere; for this rule 
has not for a long time been regarded as uncertain, or the cause of 
any "deplorable disputes." If there ha \'e been any disputes in 
regard to blockades, the uncertainty was about the facts, but not the 
law. Those nations \Yhich haYe resorted to what are appropriately 
denominated "paper blockade~," haYe rarely, if e,·er, undertaken 
afterwards to justify their conduct upon principle; but ha\'e generally 
admitted the illegality of the praetice, and inden1nified the injured 
parties. ""hat is to be adjudged ''a force sufficient really to· preYent 
access to a coast of the enen1y," has often been a se,·erely contested 
question; and certainly the declaration, which 1nerely reiterates a 
general undisputed Inaxim of 1naritime law, does nothing toward 
relieYing the subject of bluckade frmn that e1nbarrasment. ""hat 
force is requisite to constitute an effectiYe blockade, remains as un-
settled and as questionable as it was before the congress at Pari~ 
adopted the "declaration." (Senate Ex. Doc. 54th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Xo. 104, p. 6.) 
It is eyident that the fourth clause in regard to blockade 
needs further clarifying· fro1n the fact that the Brith;h 
Adtniralty ~Ianual of Sa,Tal Prize La"" adds after' the 
clause of the Declaration of Paris the words, ~.Or, at any 
rate, to create evident danger to ships attetnpting ingress 
or egress." The general statetnent in reg·ard to valid 
blockade in the ~Ian ual i~ as follo,,s: 
a See also International Law Situation, 1901, XaYal 'Var College, 
pp. 166-175. 
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VA LID BLOCKADE. 
108. A Blockade to be valid 1nust be confined to ports and coasts of 
the Enetny, but it may be instituted of one port, or of several ports, or 
of the whole seaboard of the Enemy. 
109. It may be instituted to prevent ingress only ( "Blockade in-
wards"), or egress only ("Blockade outwards"), though it is gener-
ally in~tituted to pre\·ent both ingress and egress. 
110. A Blockade to be valid n1ust be effective-that is to say, 
1naintained by a force sufficient really to pre\·ent access to the coast 
of the Enemy, or, at any rate, to create evident danger to ships attempt-
ing ingress or egress. 
111. It is· therefore the first duty of a Commander authorized to 
institute a Blockade so to dispose his Squadron as to bring about this 
result. There is then in existence a Blockade de facto. 
112. A Blockade, though thus validly instituted, ceases to exist if 
not effectually maintained. It will aceordingly cea~e to exist if the 
blockading force-
1. Abandon its position, unless abandonment be 1nerely temporary, 
or caused by stress of weather; or · 
2. Be driven away by the Enemy; or 
3. Be negligent in its duties; or 
..J:. Be partial in the execution of its duties toward one ship rather 
than another, or toward the ships of one nation rather than those of 
another. 
113. Should, however, the Commander seize se\·eral Yessels at once 
and find himself unable to detain the1n all, it will not be an improper 
act of partiality, nor is it a relaxation of the Blockade if he releases 
some and detains the rest. ( P. 29.) 
The doctrine of blockade was not the same a1nong the 
po\Yers signatories of the Declaration of Paris. The 
phrase "' ~laintained by a force sufficient really to pre\?ent 
access to the coa~t of the enen1y" \vould mean for France 
a force \vhich \Vould gh?e notifieation of the existeuce of 
the blockade to each Yessel appearing before the port. 
By Great Britain no sueh notification is deemed necessary. 
_,A_ general public notification is dee1ned sufficient. The 
amount and kind of force is also a n1atter of n1uch differ-
ence of opinion. Can a blockade be established hy sinking· 
stones, yessels, or other obstructions in a cha~nnel ~ Does 
a line of n1ines or torpedoes constitute a blockade under 
the definition of the Declaration of Paris? How far _shall 
blockade by cruisers be ad1nitted? \Y hat constitutes a 
sufficient nuinber of cruisers to render a blockade effective? 
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"Jlany such question~ ha\'"e be<'n discussed and ,,.arying 
ans'v(lrs h:n'"e been gi\'"en. It is (lasily S(len that a difl'er(lnt 
<'Onrse ·will have to be ptu·sned to r<'nder a blockade accord-
ing to the _F'rench theory eff(leth'" e- i. e .. \Yhen notification 
h(lfore a port is nec(l~sary-and to render a hloekade accord-
ing to the British theory (lfi'eetiYe- i. e., 'vhen only a 
g·eneral public notiti<"ation is nec(lssary. 
Sotne anthoriti(ls hnxe tnaintaincd that there should be 
b(lfor(l a hlockad(ld port t\\·o lines of ,·essels, one of \V hich 
should at a eon:;iderabl(l distance fron1 the port notify the 
approaehing Ill(lrchantinan of the blockade and the :-;E:lcond 
inner line should seize th(l tnerchantinan if he then attetnpts 
to enter. So111e haY(l C\'"en Inaintained that in order that a 
blockade n1ay be effecth'"e, the Yessels of the blockading 
squadron should not lw separated farther than the distance 
'vhich the range of their guns \Votdd coY(ll'. Others nlain-
tain that the question of etlrctiYen(lss depends on the 
an1onnt of conunerce entering a giYen port, and that the 
blockading squadron should ,·ar~'" in nutnber accordingly. 
lf7utt is "&lockarh-?- \ r arions schetnes ha \"·e hren tried hy 
which to obtain the l'(lStdts of blockade for the belligerents 
\Vithout all its cons(lq nences. 
For tnany years the clo<"trine of pacific blockade was held. 
Of late years this tuay be said to haYe been receiyed with 
less fa\'" Or. It was reg·arcled as a tneans of conRtraint short 
of "·ar. 
In connection ·with blockade, it should he further recog-
nized that it is a war n1easure and that it applies only in 
tin1e of ·war. 
It does not apply generally in titne of dotnestic hostilities 
of the nature of insurgency e\'"en though a single State or 
eyen ~e,·eral States Inay ha \ '"C reeognized thr belligerency 
of th(l insurg(lnt. If an actual state of \Var does not exist, 
hloekade and it~ cons(lq uciH~es is not adn1itted. Until tll<' 
parent State recognize~ the belligerency of the insurgent 
body, ~'the seale on 'vhich hostilities are conducted by the 
insurgents rnust be considered.,, 
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The position of the United States i~ stated in a letter of 
Secretary Hay of N oven1ber 15, 1902. He :;ay~: 
Blockade of enemy port:-: iR, in its strict ~en:-:c, conceiYed to be a defi-
nite act of an internationally responsible sovereign in the exerci~e of 
a right of belligerency. Its exercise involves the suceessiye states of, 
fir~t, proclamation by a sovereign state of the purpose to enforce a 
blockade from an announced date. Such proclamation i~ entitled to 
respect by other soYereigns conditionally on the blockade proving 
effective. Second, warning of vessels approaching the blockaded port 
under circumstances preventing their haYing previous adual or pre-
sumptive knowledge of the international proclamation of blockade. 
Third, f:eizure of a ve:-;sel attempting to run the blockade. Fourth,. 
adju<iication of the question of good prize by a competent court of ad-
miralty of the blockading sovereign. (Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
and other Opinions and Precedents, U. S. Naval \Var College, 1904, 
p. 207.) 
T'hat there rnay be doubt a~ to "That constitutes efi"eetive 
blockade nuty be seen in the rcplie:; to the Venezuelan 
decree of June 28., 1902.· The decree was a:s follows: 
The constitutional President of the Pnited States of \'" enezuela 
decrees: 
ARTICLE 1. In con~equence of the occupation of Ciudao Bolivar by 
insurrectionary forces, navigation in the water:-: of the Orinoco is pro-
hibited, the extent of the coast line which embrace~ its mouths is 
blockadeo, and the ports of Guira an<l Cano Colorado are closed to 
trade and navigation. 
ART. 2. The port of La Vela oe Coro is likewise oeclared to be 
blockaded. 
Awr. 3. The necessary naval forces shall be appojnted to eqforce the 
said blockade in a real and efficacious manner. 
ART. 4. The commanders of the Hhips appointed to earry out the 
blockade of the above-Inentioned ports shall duly ob8erve the ordi-
nances relating to the corsairs, dated the :10th of l\Iarch, 1882, now in 
force, and the following provisions: 
1. Ships which have been dispatehed for the blockaded ports shall 
haye the follo·wing terms, after the present decree has been cmntnuni-
eate<l to their respediYe Governments, allowed the1n to enter: Steam-
Hhip~ proeeeding from Europe, one month; sailing YE'Ssels; t\VO Inonths; 
stea1nships proceeding from the United States, fifteen days; sailillg 
yessels, one month; ships proceeding frmn the "rest Indies and Deme-
rara, ·whether stean1ers or sailing Vl'Ssels, shall haye a term of ten days, 
with the exception of those proceeding from Trinioa<l and Grenada, 
'vhich shall have hut two days. 
2. l\ferchandise which is de:-;tined for any port within the line of 
blockade tnay, at the di~cretion of the owner, be disembarked at any 
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other established custom~ port on payment of the rP~pecth·e custom~ 
dntie~. 
:~. On any vessel, proceeding from any of the places aboYe men-
tioned, reaching the line of blockade the conunawler of the nearest 
man-of-war shall communicate to him the order again~t <·ro8sing it, 
and in case he persist he shall be considered to wish to violate the 
blockade . 
.A.Jtr. 5. The ministers of the interior, foreign affair~, finance, and 
war and marine are charged to seP to the execution of this decree and 
to communicate it to all whom it may concern. 
GiYen, ~igued, sealed with the seal of the national executiYe and 
countersigned by the 1ninisters of the interior, foreign affairs, finance, 
and war and marine, at the federal palace at Caraca~, this 28th day of 
June, 1902, year 91 of the independence and 4--1 of the federation. 
C'IPRIAXO CASTRO. 
The l.J nited State~ tninister. under date of Septetuber 7~ 
1!102. reported to Secretary Hay: 
SIR: I have the honor to infonn you that I haYe learned that Ger-
Inany and Great Britain based their refu~al to reeognize the blockade 
decreed by the Yenezuela GoYenunent a~ effecti ye on the assertion 
that the naYal force of Yenezuela is not su"fJl.ciently ~trong to render 
it effecti\·e. France confined her prote~t to Carupano an<l Cumana, 
stating that French ships had entered thoee ports without let or hin-
drance. I decided that, as we haye no special interests in the port~ 
blockaded, and as they ~eem to n1e likely to he occupied and aban-
doned from time to time by the reYolutionist~, it would be sufficient 
for me to simply remark to the minister for foreign affairs that we could 
not recognize as effediYe any blockade that we find to be ineffectiYe. 
( U. S. Foreign Relations, 1902, pp. 1070, 1071.) 
In an extended correspondence with the Freneh Gov-
enunent the President of Venezuela tried to tnaintain that 
the blockade "·a~ efi'ecti,·e if the ,·essels attetnpting to 
enter found it diffi<'nl t and were in danger frotn \r enezue-
lan blockader~. He ~aid the blockading fleet '"as in pro-
portion to the ordinary conunercc and that tnost of the 
ships 'vere pre\?ented frotn entering, hut this was not re-
garded as sufficient. It is not that tnost of the ship~ ~honld 
be pre,?ented, but that any ship ~honld he in peril frotn 
attetnpting- to enter the hloekaded port. 
Several cnse~ inYoh~ing- questions of effieiency of block-
a de are briefly sutntnarized in Atlay's edition of \Yheaton 's 
International Law: 
A que~tion respecting the efficiency of a blockade arose during the 
l~t Turco-Russian war. Turkey prod~imed a blockade of the whole 
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of the coasts of the Black Sea, front Trebizond to the mouth of the 
Danube, and mainta~ned it by a force of cruisers in the Black Sea 
itself. This force preYented n1o~t of the trade '"vith the Rus~ian ports 
from being earried on, but, besides this, the Porte Htationed two cruis-
ers in the Bosphorus, and any vessels which escaped the Blaek Sea 
Squadron were eaptured on arriving there and taken before the Prize 
Court sitting at Constantinople. A n1ore complete and effieient block-
ade could not possibly be devised; neYertheless it was argued for the· 
owners of prizes that, being neutral vessels (mostly Greek), as soon as 
they had escaped the Black Sea Squadron they were free and were no 
longer liable to capture. The Turkish Prize Court, however, con-
deinned the vessels. This case was peculiarly important from the fact 
that some of the foreign ambassadors at the Porte had intimated that 
if these vessels were not condemned the blockade would not he recog-
nized by other countries. To hold that these Greek vessels \rere not 
liable to be captured in the Bosphorus would ha,·e been tantanwunt 
to opening the general c01nmerce of the Black Sea to Greece, and this 
would have immediately invalidated the whole blockade. 
The blockade of Formosa was notified by France in 1884. Great 
Britain protested, through its ambassador at Paris, alleging that the 
force at the disposal of the French adtniral was insufficient. The block-
ade was in consequence abandoned till the arrival of reenforce1nents. 
The blockade of insurgent Haitian ports proclaimed by Haiti in .No-
vem ber, 1888, having ceased to be effective in the July following, Lord 
Salisbury notified the Haitian Go\·ernment that it could not longer 
be respected, and that British vessels entering or leaving ports in the 
possession of the insurgents must not be molested by the Government 
cruisers. (Rections 513 b, c, d.) 
The question as to 'vhat constitutes an effective blockade 
'vas raised in the case of the Olin de Rodrigues in lSHS. 
In an opinion handed do,vn by Chief Justice Fuller in 1899 
(174 U.S., 510), the position of the court, with the grounds 
therefor, \vas stated as follo,vs: 
To be binding, the blockade 1nust be known, and the blockading 
force 1nust be present; but is there any rule of law determining that 
the presence of a particular force is essential in order to render a 
blockade effective? 'Ve do not think so, but, on the contrary, that 
the test is whether the blockade is practically effective, and. that that 
is a question, though a mixed one, 1nore of fact than of Jaw. 
The fourth maxim of the Declaration of Paris (Apr. 16, 1856), was: 
"Blockades, in order to be binding, n1ust be effectiYe; that is to say, 
ntaintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast 
of the ene1ny." l\Ianifestly this broad definition \Vas not intended to 
be literally applied. The objeet was to correct the abuse, in the early 
part of the century, of paper blockades, where extensive coasts were 
put under blockade by proclamation, without the presence of any 
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force, ur an inatlequatc force: and the question of what might be 
sutlieient force wa~ neces:-:arily left to be determined according to the 
particular circum:-:tanees. 
This was put by Lord Rus~ell, in his note to :Jir. )Jason of February 
10, 1861, thn~: ''The Declaration of Paris was in truth directed against 
what were onee termed 'paper blockades;' that is, blocka(les not sn~­
tained by any actual force, or su:-:tained by a notoriously inadequate 
naYal force, such as an occa:-;ional appearance of a man-of-war in the 
offing, or the like. * * * The interpretation, therefore, placed by 
Her :Jiaje~ty's Go\·ernment on the Deelaration was that a blockade, 
in order to be respl'Cted b~· neutral~, 1nu~t be practically effectiYe. 
* * * It is proper to add that the same Yiew of the meaning and 
effect of the articles of the Declaration of Paris on the subject of 
blockade:-: which i~ aboYe explained was taken by the representati\·e 
of the "Gnited State~ at the Court of St. James (:Jir. Dallas) during the 
communications whieh pas:-:ed betwPPn the two GoYernments some 
year::-! before the pre~ent war with a Yiew to the accession of the 
United State~ to that Declaration." (Hall's Int. Law, paragraph 260, 
p. 730, note.) 
The quotations fro111 the Parliamentary Debates of :Jiay, 1861, giYen 
Ly :Jlr. Dana in notf' 233 to the eighth edition of \Yheaton on Interna-
tional Law, afford interesting illustrationt:·of what was consitlered the 
measure of effeetiYene~s; and an e:xtraet i:-:; abo there giYen from a 
note of the Department of Foreign Affair~ of France of September, 1861, 
in which that is defineo: ''Force:-: ~ufficient to preYent the ports being 
approached without e:xpo~ure to a certain danger." 
Later in the ~atne ease it is ~tated: 
~\s we hold that an effecti,·e blockade i~ a blockade so effectiYe as 
to make it clangerou~ in fact for Ye~sels to attempt to f'nter the block-
aded port, it follows that the que:::tion of effectiYeness is not controlled 
by the number of the blockading fon·e. In other word~, the position 
can not be 1naintained that one modern eruiser, though sufficient in 
fact, i8 not sufficient a:-: matter of law. 
The de tin it ion of eti'ecti ,~e hlo('kadc wa~ not ::::ufficiently 
clear to all. Fau('hille ~ay~: 
La definition du blocus donnee par le congres de Paris n'est pas 
aust:i preeisP qu' elle aurait ll u etre. Sans doute, elle prohibe certaine-
ment le bloeu~ fictif qu' on appelle blocus .c.:Hr papier, en Yertu duquel, 
d'un trait de plume, Ul1 gonYernement met en etat de siege des ports 
et del::i ct1tes entieres; 1nai~ exclut-elle aus~i formellentent le blocus par 
croisiere? 
and later, 
Xous ne croyons point toutefois que cette declaration ait youlu pnL 
c..: isement autoriser les bJocu~ par croi~iere; elle ne les a pas lh~saYoues 
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expressement, elle les a desayoues d'une fa<;on indirecte seulement. 
Ri la premiere phrase est indecise et peut permettre ~l 1' Angleterre, 
(lont elle est l'ccuvre, de revenir ~l son aucienne pratique, la derniere 
phrase est au contrairie plus precise et se rapproche d'une definition 
exacte du blocus effectif: En effet, il faut, d'apn~s elle, que l'acces dn 
littoral ennemi soit interdit reellement, soit rendu impossible par les 
forces bloquantes; or dans le blocus par croish~re ce n'est pas l'abord 
de la cote qui est defendu, rnais des vaisseaux croisant ~~ une grande 
distance du port bloque arretent les b<itiments qui s' y dirigent. 
Quoi qu'il en soit, nons ne pouvons approuver une definition qui 
prete ainsi ~l double sens, et nous appelons de tous nos vreux le jour 
ou les puissances, se depouillant enfin des idees d'interet personnel, 
donneront une definition claire et precise du blocus effectif. (Du 
Blocus lVIariti1ne, pp. 110, 111.) 
Wharton says in regard to blockades: 
A blockade to be effective need not be perfect. It is not necessary 
that the beleaguered port should be hennetically sealed. It is not 
enough to make the blockade ineffective that on some particularly 
storn1y night a blockade runner slid through the blockading squadron. 
Nor is it enough that through some exceptional and rare negligence 
of the officers of one of the blockading vessels a blockade runner was 
allo\Yed to pass when perfect vigilance could haye arrested hiin. But 
if the blockade is not in the main effecth·e-if it can be easily eluded-
if escaping its toils is due not to casus or some rare and exceptional 
negligence, but to a general laxity or want of efficiency-then such 
blockade is not valid. (Commentaries American Law, section 233.) 
The United States has entered into several treaty agree-
ments in regard to blockade. An1ong those still in force 
are the following: 
Article XIII of the treaty with Prussia, l\1ay 1, 1828, 
declares: 
Considering the remoteness of the respective countries of the two 
high contracting parties and the u?certainty resulting therefrom 
with respect to the various events which n1ay take place, it is agreed 
that a merchant vessel belonging to either of them which may be 
bound to a port supposed at the ti1ne of its departure to be block-
aded shall not, however, be captured or condemned for haYing 
attmnpted a first time to enter said port, unless it can be proved that 
said vessel could and ought to have learned during its voyage that 
the blockade of the place in question still continued. But all vessels 
\Vhich, after having been warned off once, shall, during the same voy-
age, attempt a second time to enter the same blockaded port during 
the continuance of the said blockade, shall then subject themselves to 
be detained and condemned. 
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'Thi~ articlP also oecurs in the treaty with S\Yeden-Xor-
way, ,July ±. 18:27. 
The treaty "·ith ItalY of February 26, 1871, .A .. rtiele 
XIY. states: 
And wherea~ it frequently happen::: that ,-e~:;:eb sail for a port or a 
place belonging to an ~neiny without kno\\·ing that the san1e i:::; 
be~iegecl, blockaded, ur inYe5tetl, it i~ ngreeu that eYery Ye~sel ~o cir-
cumstanced Inay be turned away from ~tH.'h port or place, but shall 
not be detained, nor ~hall any part of her cargo, if not contrabantl of 
war, be cunfi~catecl, unleE~, after a warning of ~ueh blockade or inYest-
ment fro1n an otlieP.r comnmncling a ye:;:~el of the blockading forces, 
by an indorsement of such officer on the paper~ of the Ye~sel, mention-
ing the date and the latitude and longitude where such iw.lorsement 
was Inade, :::;he shall again attempt to enter; but ~he shall be per-
mitted to go to any other port or plaee she shall think proper. Xor 
shall any YeE~el of either that may haYe entered into ~uch a port before 
the same was actually besieged, blockaded, or in,·e~te<l by the otlwr 
be restraineu from quitting ::-:uch place with her t•argo, nor, if found 
therein after the reduction and ::::urrender, shall such Yc:-:sel or her 
cargo be liable to confiscation, hut they shall be reston,,} to the own-
ers thereof; and if any yes~el hadn~ thus entered any port before 
the blockade took plact>, :3hall take on boanl a cargo after the block-
ade be e::;tablished, she shall be subject to being warned by the 
blockading forces to return to the port hlockade<l and discharge the 
Eaid eargo, an<l if after recPiYing the saitl warning the Yessel shall per-
sist in going out with the eargo, :-:he shall be liable to the saine con-
seyuences a~ a yessel attempting to enter a blockaded port after being 
warned off by the blockading force::;:. 
Thi:s article. otnitting ··by an indor~etnent of such offi-
cer on the papers of the Yes~el, tnentioning the date and 
the latitude and longitude where such indorse1nent was 
tnade. ·~ appears in the treaty with Brazil of Dece1nber 12, 
18:28 . 
.. A .. rticle 21 of the Japanese reg-ulation::; relating to cap· 
ture at sea of :\larch 7~ 190±~ states that-
Blockade is to close an enemy's port, bay, or coa~t with force, and 
is effectiYe when the force is strong enough to threaten any Yessels 
that atte1npt to go in or out of the blockaded port or bay or to approach 
the blockaded coast. 
Conclusio,~.-In regard to the question, •· Should the 
pro\·i::;ion~ of the Declaration of Paris of 185ti be reYised? ~' 
it tnay be said that the first clause, "Prirateering is and 
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remains abolished" should be nutintained. Regulations 
should be n1ade, ho·wever, for the control of vessels such as 
those of the auxiliary navy. 
In ease regulations in regard to the exe1nption from cap-
ture of pri 'Tate property at sea in ti1ue of war are adopted 
the second and third articles, ''The neutral flag cover~ 
ene1ny~s goods, 'vith the exception of contraband of 1var," 
and "Neutral good~, 'vith the exception of contraband of 
war, are not liable to capture un4er enemy's flag," should 
be 1nodified in such a 1nanner as to coincide therewith. 
The fourth clau~e, "Blockades, in order to be binding, 
Blust be eff'ectiYe-that is to say~ 1naintained by a suffi-
cient force really to prevent access to the coast of the 
enen1y ," should recei,Te new state1nent sho·wing exactly 
·what is 1neant and to what situations it applies, particularly 
·what constitutes an efl'ecti,re blockade. 
Pacific blockades will not affect po·wers not parties to 
the1n. (International La'v Situations, 1902, Situation VII, 
pp. 75-83.) 
In fine, the Declaration which is still binding on the sig-
natory powers n1ight \veil be subject to full consideration, 
and should before general acceptance be revised. 
